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ABSTRACTS 
f he Balance of Power in the Theory of 
International Relations 
The Balance of Power is a concept 
which has been tied to the theory of 
International Relations since its begin- 
nings. Recent studies place this field of 
study as pertaining from the Second 
World War. 
The will of the United States in assu- 
ming the r6le of World Power saw the 
beginning of International Relations as 
an university subject. Since 1945, the 
theory in this field has come maninly 
from the United States. 
The concept of the Balance of Power 
occupies a central place in the theory 
of International Relations. Different 
schools of International Relations have 
adopted it and varied it according to 
the needs of their models of analysis. 
From the classics of Post-War Realism 
(Hans J .  Morgenthau) through the Sys- 
temists of the 70's (Morton Kaplan) to 
the new Realists ((in fashion)) nowa- 
days, all have used the notion of the 
Balance of Power to elaborate their 
theory of International Relations. 
Also, on the practica1 side -in the 
direction of Foreign Policy- we can talk 
about the application of the Balance of 
Power. For example, the work of Henry 
Kissinger as head of US Foreign Policy 
has been called the policy of the balance o f  
power among the superpowers. 
This study tries to dea1 with a series 
of questions relative to the aformentio- 
ned concept. After some brief clarifica- 
tions about the problems derived from 
the translation of the English term 
(Balance of Power), this study divides 
into two parts. The first part explains 
the historical origins and disciplines of 
the concept, while the second part, the 
main part of the essay, deals with a 
systemisation of the diverse uses and 
significances that the theories of Inter- 
national Relations have given to the 
Balance of Power. 
The << Perestroyka>> 
In order to analyse the scope and the author will divide it into two points 
limits of the new course of reforms in of view: 1) the historical viewpoint 
the U.S.S.R. known as cperestroyka~, which briefly reexamines former at- 
ternpts at reform, always associated 
with a change of Party Secretary and 
which make it evident that the Soviet 
system has, in spite of its inflexibility, 
exlserimented relevant changes. 2) The 
structural viewpoint which has, for its 
part, allowed the basic parametres to 
be defined in which these attempts have 
occurred and which have characterised 
unti1 now the essence of the Soviet 
system. The newness of the present 
sitluation in relation with previous ones 
is the extreme worsening of the same 
problems, particularly in the economic 
field, where in the past diverse attempts 
at reform were tried. All the economic, 
political and social indicators go in this 
direction as the General Secretary him- 
self explained. But the most serious 
proven fact as soon as it touches the 
fundamental nucleus of the Soviet dog- 
ma is that the system's production 
relations have become an obstacle in 
the developpment of the productive 
forces. This picture of general deteriora- 
tion, morale included, makes the author 
think that the present Soviet leadership 
finds itself facing nothing less than a 
global crysis in the system. 
In the words of Gorbachov himself, he 
is try to ~revolutionises but in no way 
to change the system. It follows from 
this that one of the foundations of the 
system remains untouched (and untou- 
chable given the actual conditions), 
that is, the monopoly of power in the 
hands of the Party. 
Soviet political developments and prospects 
'rhe changes which are now taking 
place in the Soviet Union are not, 
according to the author, a simple cos- 
metic's operation as the West often 
thinks it is. The weight of the real 
problems arising in the Soviet Union, 
which everytirne are more unsustaina- 
ble, as well as the evidence of some true 
changes both in the Party and State 
system as in the economic field and the 
Foireign Policy, show that a real evolu- 
tion is taking place in the U.S.S.R. The 
vital question is in knowing which 
reforms and changes are being made 
nww and to how far the Soviet Union is 
prepared to go. The author will exami- 
ne in detail the main aspects of the 
economic reforms, some of which have 
already been put into practice; the 
evolution of.the approaches in the field 
of IForeign Policy; the new proposals for 
a nnore democratic running of the poli- 
tic,al apparatus (always within the sin- 
gle Party system); as well as the most 
significant personnel changes in the 
high echelons of power. In the opinion 
of the author the Soviet Union is ente- 
ring on the verge of a path which if does 
not take it to the level of a democratic 
State as in the West, at least -and this 
would be a big step forward- it could 
allow the Soviet Union to be an enligh- 
tened authoritarian régime. It remains 
to be seen the result of the struggle 
which Mikhail Gorbachev is waging 
-and which he will doubtless be wa- 
ging for a rather long time- in order to 
guarantee continuity in his new policy. 
The difficulty of this struggle is that as 
well as specially adverse material con- 
ditions, the new General Secretary has 
to overcome on the one hand, all levels 
of opposition from members within the 
Party and the State, who certainly do 
not want to see their privileges of power 
and social status in any danger; and, on 
the other hand, the inertia and resistan- 
ce from considerable sections of Soviet 
society which view suspiciously the 
new sacrifices which are being asked. 
from them. 
The New Soviet Approach to Security 
The scope and intensity of Mikhail 
Gorbachev's disarmament campaign 
mark a sharp break with the practice of 
his predecessors (with some exceptions 
for example, Nikita Khrushchev). The 
Soviet Union with Mikhail Gorbachev 
has offered the prospect of a disarma- 
ment agreement more comprehensive 
than any that has been proposed in the 
two decades of superpower negotia- 
tions. If the Soviet were to make any 
further compromises, they would essen- 
tially be adopting the Reagan position, 
and this would damage not only their 
own but also U.S. and world security: a 
((compromise)> agreement that official- 
ly abandons the long-standing objecti- 
ves of arms control in favor of Reagan's 
objectives could be worse than no 
agreement at all. There is no doubt that 
the Soviets intend their new flexibility 
to contrast favorably with U.S. intransi- 
gence, and that they are quite sensitive 
to public perceptions of their diploma- 
tic efforts. This is no reason, however, to 
dismiss the new Soviet proposals. The 
fact that they address traditional Soviet 
security and economic concerns, albeit 
in a far more creative way than in the 
past, means that they should be taken 
seriously. Furthermore, the attempt to 
abandon the Brezhnev legacy has appa- 
rently met with some interna1 resistan- 
ce and has been pursued at some risk to 
Gorbachev's leadership. His willingness 
to accept those risks further attests to 
his seriousness. 
The State of European lntegration at the coming 
into effect of the Common Act 
The Common Act came into effect on 
the first of July, 1987. It reintroduces 
majority vote and establishes a whole 
series of advances in Community inte- 
gration. This process has taken place 
with more difficulties than anticipated 
and has also coincided with some days 
of demoralisation within the Communi- 
ty resulting from the failure of the 
Council of Europe in Brussels. 
The Council of Europe, held on the 
29th and 30th of June, 1987, concluded 
with the feeling that the European 
Community is going through a serious 
crisis. This was caused by Britain's 
opposition to budget increases which 
are not accompanied by a full reconsi- 
deration of the present destination of 
Community resources. The result has 
been that the much more important 
event in the Community's history - the 
taking effect of the Common Act - has 
been completely overshadowed in the 
news. 
Furthermore, the liberalisation of air 
traffic in the Community seems to be 
blocked at the moment through the 
Spanish position of profiting by entry 
into the Community to unfreeze the 
contention issue of Gibraltar, which has 
been a never-ending issue for Spanish 
foreign policy since the Treaty of 
Utrecht. Thus this feeling of demorali- 
sation within the Community could 
turn out to be even greater. 
However, it seems to me that the 
reality of the situation doesn't justify 
such a pessimistic analysis. 
The European Community is much 
more than a specific budget problem or 
a lpolitical tension about the airport in in the realisation of the Common Inter- 
Gibraltar. It is also more than a recu- nal Market, as well as the beginning of a 
rrent, almost permanent, argument series of useful institutional changes. 
over agricultura1 prices in Europe, both While it is true that the Common Act 
on a Community level as regards the has only been able to come into effect 
standard of living of European farmers, after a long and difficult periplus from 
and on the international level of the its formulation in Luxembourg and The 
Community as regards the degree of Hague in February of 1986 unti1 the 
fulfillment of international commercial Irish referendum of the 26th of May, 
norms and the interference which the 1987, but even so it results to be much 
Community is accused of in the functio- more important thant the outcome of 
ning of prices in world markets of one of the many Council of Europe 
agricultura1 produce. six-monthly meeting. 
The European Community is a pro- However, for the reasons autlines 
cess of economic integration and, little above and as a result of journalistic 
by little, of European policy which goes logic, the coming into effect of the 
along with a millenial aspiration to Common Act - which represents a 
European unity. This concept to Euro- small but important step forward - 
pean unity has been defended through has been relegated to the inside pages of 
history by such prominent people as newspapers and the less important spa- 
Aristotle, Dante, Briand and Churchill. ces on radio and TV news. Meanwhile, 
But since the practice of this unity is so the problems in the Summit of Heads of 
new, we cannot afford to get cauhgt up State and Government received front 
in disagreements or misunderstandings page attention. 
over specific aspects do day to day It is surely true that ((good news is no 
economic integration. The Common news)), while bad news is - but that is 
Act, in this sense, is an instigator of new another discussion. 
aclvances in European integration and 
The Brazilian Foreign Debt 
When at  the beginning of February Perhaps the figure of $ 108 billion on 
1987 Brazil announced a 90-day mora- its own does not mean much. However, 
torium on payment of the interest on its if we take into account that these $ 108 
debt, the subject of Brazilian foreign billion are the 11 per cent of $ 980 
debt made front page news again. Why? billion which is the total debt of all the 
Is Brazil by any chance the only country developping countries in the world, 
that has ever made a moratorium on then we begin to realise the size and 
interest payments? Is Brazil the only importance of the Brazilian foreign 
country that has a foreign debt? debt. An importance which increases 
Thus, the answer lies in the tremen- when we realise that such and amount 
dous importance that the Brazilian fo- represents 30 per cent of all Latin 
reign debt has for the world financial American countries foreign debt. But 
artd economical system. A debt that above all, the problem of the Brazilian 
now reaches $ 108 billion and which as foreign debt takes on a special drama 
we shall see later originated and deve- when we consider the threat it poses to 
lopped in the years that have come to be the American financial system: Citi- 
named as the Brazilian ~economic mi- corp, the major banking company in 
racle n. the world has outstanding loans tied up 
in Brazil to the value of 73 per cent of its 
own capital; and Hanover Manufactu- 
res, 5th in the world ranking, to the 
value of 77 per cent. Altogether the nine 
major American banks have funds to 
the value of 45.8 per cent of their own 
capital in Brazil. If we realise that in 
the USA the banks are obliged to: 
a) maintain a minimum relation of 5 
per cent between their own capital and 
the loans; and b) reduce their capital by 
the value of irrecoverable loans, then it 
is obvious that if Brazil decided not to 
face its obligations, the nine American 
banks together would be obliged to 
reduce their own capital by 45 per cent, 
provided they had reserves for this type 
of loss. If this were not the case, and, 
in order to face the 5 per cent capital- 
loans rule, the said banks would also 
have to reduce their credit by another 
45 per cent approximately. That is to 
say! that the credit sources in the 
United States would close at 45 per 
cent. The number of companies that 
would go bankrupt as a result of lack of 
resources as well as resulting unem- 
ployment and a fall in demand would 
be tremendous. Furthermore if we take 
into account how internationalized the 
world economy is, controlled mainly by 
the United States, it is obvious that an 
interna1 recession in Brazil would rapi- 
dly expand to the whole of the world 
economy. On top of that, the Japanese 
banks are the creditors of 9 per cent of 
the Brazilian foreign debt, the British 8 
per cent, the French 7 per cent and the 
American 25 per cent. 
In summing up I think that it would 
not be a dramatization to consider a 
possible world recession as a conse- 
quence of a sharp crisis in the interna- 
tional banking system provoked by a 
lack of service in the Brazilian debt. 
Here lies the great importance of the 
Brazilian foreign debt. The following 
pages try to dea1 with this, how the 
Brazilian foreign debt generated along- 
side the neconomic miracle)) which to- 
gether were the cause of the 1982 crisis; 
how the debt was reorganized and what 
the possibilities of Brazil are in facing 
such a ((financial)> mortgage. As well as 
this, the greatest basic needs of Brazil 
will be discussed that may be able to 
((sociallya mortgage the future of the 
nation, and which will define a new 
developped momentum which will 
allow us to speak of a Brazilian ((social 
miraclen. 
